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Windle: Constitutional Law

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
ASSOCIATED GENERAL CONTRACTORS v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO:
AN INSURMOUNTABLE HURDLE FOR
AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Associated General Contractors v. City of San Francisco,! the Ninth Circuit held that a San Francisco ordinance2
giving preference to minorities3 bidding on city contracts of
$50,000 or less violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Constitution!
II. FACTS

In response to allegations of discrimination in the awarding
of San Francisco ("city") municipal contracts, the Board of Supervisors, in 1982, commissioned a study by the Human Rights
Commission.II The Commission reported finding specific claims
1. 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Kozinski, J.; the other panel members were
Hug, J., and Beezer, J., concurring.)
2. SAN FRANCISCO, CA, ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 12D (1984).
3. [d. at §§ 12D.8(B)(2), 12D.8(B)(3), 12D.9(B)(1), 12D.3. Preferences were also provided for women-owned-businesses, and locally-owned-businesses. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 939, 942.
4. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 944, discussing the U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 2.
5. San Francisco Human Rights Commission, Investigation Into Minority and
Women Business Participation in City Contracting, October 1983, reprinted in 2 San
Francisco Human Rights Commission, Summary Report (abr. ed. 1983) [hereinafter
HRC Report]. The report states: "While some public testimony included allegations of
overt discrimination in the award of contracts, the majority of witnesses testified to allegations of plrumed or benign exclusion from the notice and award process by virtually all
City departments." [d. at vi.
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of discriminatory activities conducted by the city.6 Included in
these allegation were statements by minority firms7 and individuals working for the city.s Statistical data was also presented
that showed an imbalance in the number of city contract dollars
awarded to minority firms and the number of minority firms in
the city.9
Based on its findings, the Board of Supervisors passed City
Ordinance 12D.I0 To further the attempt to aid minorities, the
ordinance required the following: 1) each city department would
set aside ten percent of its purchasing dollars for minorityowned business (MBEs);ll 2) MBEs would get a five percent
bidding preference for those contracts put out to bid;12 3) each
city department would establish a yearly goal for the percentage
of contracting dollars to go to MBEs;13 and 4) as an overall goal,
thirty percent of the city's contracting dollars should go to
MBEs.14
The ordinance was challenged in the district court by Associated General Contractors (AGC)115 which sought injunctive and
declaratory relief16 to invalidate the ordinance op the grounds
that its provisions violated the San Francisco Charter,17 three
separate federal civil rights statutes, IS and the Equal Protection
6. Id. at 18-23.
7.Id.
8.Id.
9. Id. at 27-3l.
10. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 93l.
11. SAN FRANCISCO, CA, ADMIN. CODE ch.12D § .8(b)2 (1984).
12. Id. at § .8(b)(3).
13. Id. at § .9(b)(1).
14. Id. at § .3.
15. Associated General Contractors of America is a Trade Association that was
founded in 1918, has 108 local groups and consists of general contractors engaged in
construction. 1 Encyclopedia of Associations, 105 (22 ed. 1988).
16. Associated General Contractors v. City and County of San Francisco, 619 F.
Supp. 334 (N.D. Cal. 1985).
17. SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. CHARTER § 7.200 (1986) provides that contracts will be
awarded to the lowest reliable and responsible bidder.
18. AGC claimed violations of the following:
(1) 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1964) which provides that:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall'
have the same right in every State and territory to make and
enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the
full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens,
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Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 19
The city filed a motion for summary judgment.2o Finding no
genuine dispute over a material issue of fact, the district court
granted the city's motion for summary judgment.21 The district
court's ruling also found that the city's affirmative action ordinance was constitutional. 22 The district court ruling included an
extensive finding of facts. 23 In response to the challenge made by
the construction industry, the district court had specific evidence that demonstrated an imbalance between the number of
minority contracts awarded and the number of minority firms in
the city.24 The district court decision was appealed to the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals which found the program unconstitutional. 211
III. BACKGROUND
As a tool to remedy racial discrimination, government entities have adopted affirmative action programs.28 Often these proand shall be subject to like punishment, pains, penalties,
taxes, licenses, and exactions of every kind, and to no other.
(2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) which states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United states or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
other party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
(3) 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1964) which states:
No person in the United States shall, on the ground of race,
color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be
denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under
any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.
19. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
20. Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of San Francisco, 619 F. Supp. 334, 336
(N.D. Cal. 1985).
21. Id. at 335.
22.Id.
23. Associated Gen. Contractor, 619 F. Supp. 334.
24. Id. at 5-10.
25. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 944.
26. See Paradise v. Prescott, 767 F.2d 1514 (11th Cir. 1985) (The court ordered desegregation of Alabama's state trooper force); Morrow v. Crisler, 491 F.2d 1053 (5th Cir.
1974) (The court ordered desegregation of the Mississippi Highway Patrol); Local 93 Int'l
Ass'n of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct 3063 (1986) (The Court supported
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grams have provided for preferential treatment based on race. 27
Individuals not eligible for preferential treatment have chal.lenged these programs because they are based on racial distinctions prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment.28 As a result,
programs designed to remedy discrimination are themselves
challenged as being discriminatory.29
This portion of the article will focus on four areas: A. Development of the test for reviewing affirmative action, B. The
struggle of affirmative action, C. The position of the current
Court, and D. The views of other circuits.

A.

DEVELOPMENT OF THE TEST FOR REVIEWING AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION.

The United States Supreme Court first spoke of a stringent
review of actions aimed at "discrete and insular minorities"30 in
United States v. Carolene Products. 3 ! Such actions will not be
approved unless they serve a "compelling interest"32 and the
means chosen are "narrowly tailored" to achieve that purpose.33
This level of review has been classified as strict and very few
legislative acts survive a strict analysis. 34 It has been described
as "strict in theory and fatal in fact."35
Classifications that do not affect minority groups or fundamental rights are subjected to a rational basis scrutiny.36 Here
the justification for the legistative act can be any reasonable
efforts to redress discrimination by the city fire department in promotion of minority
firefighters).
27. See, e.g., Paradise, 767 F.2d at 1522, where one minority trooper was ordered
promoted with each nonminority.
28. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, extended to every person in Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S.
1, 22 (1948).
29. See supra note 26 and accompanying text for cases where nonminorities challenged programs for being discriminatory.
30. United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
31. Id.
32. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980).
33. Id.
34. See generally L. TRmE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1000 (1978) [hereinafter
L. Tribe].
35. See Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for
a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1972).
36. See generally L. TamE, supra note 34 at 994.
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means for implementing the goal of the act. s, It is rare that
under such a test an act would be deemed unconstitutional.ss
Occupying the middle ground, is the intermediate level of
scrutiny which has been most often applied to distinctions based
on gender. 39 The classification must be based on an "important
governmental interest"40 and be "substantially related" to that
goal!l
Affirmative action plans are generally designed to correct
the effects of discrimination against "insular minorities. "42 During the era of school desegregation, the Court determined that
the need to integrate the nation's public schools was a compelling governmental interest!S Programs that took a child's race
into consideration were viewed as a permissible use of a racial
classification!4 The goal of school desegregation outweighed the
objections of nonminority students that their Fourteenth
Amendment rights had been violated!!! The use of race was justified since the government was attempting to remedy the effects
of past discrimination!S Therefore, affirmative action programs
whose goals are to remedy past discrimination are capable of
passing the Court's strict scrutiny test!'
One of the critical elements in justifying a race-conscious
program is whether there has been racial discrimination!S In the
school desegregation cases, the Court first determined that there
37. Id. at 996.
38. See generally J. NowAK, R ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONST1TUTIONAL LAW 530, (3d
ed. 1986). [hereinafter J. NOWAK].
39. See generally L. TamE, supra note 34 at 1060-77.
40. See generally J. NOWAK, supra note 38 at 531-33.
41. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The Court applied intermediate scrutiny to classifications based on gender.
42. United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
43. Brown v. Board of Educ., (Brown I) 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954). The U.S. Supreme
Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits separation of students because of
their race. Id.
44. See, e.g., North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971). A
North Carolina anti-busing law was held invalid as preventing implementation of desegregation plans. Id.
45.Id.
46.Id.
47. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
48. North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 46 (1971).
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was illegal discrimination!9 This provided the compellng interest to survive strict scrutiny analysis. lio Later, voluntary programs to remedy discrimination were implemented by different
governmental entities. iiI These programs were voluntary in that
no court order created the program and there was no judicial
finding of past discrimination.1i2 When a nonminority challenged
the program, the court was placed in the position of determining
if there was a compelling need to implement the program. liS

B.

THE STRUGGLE OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION.

In University of California Regents v. Bakke,li4 the Supreme Court ruled that a race-conscious program implemented
by the Medical School at Davis, to increase the number of minority medical students, was unconstitional.1i1i
The medical school had created a dual admission program. liS
Nonminority applicants were summarily rejected if they had a
grade point average of below 2.5. Minority applicants were not
rejected if their average fell below 2.5 and were reviewed by a
separate committee.1i7 Included in the Davis plan was the reservation of sixteen seats in the first year class exclusively for minority candidates.lis The effect was that nonminorities could apply for only eighty-four of the one hundred seats in the first year
class while minorities could apply for all one hundred.1i9
49.Id.
50. Fullilove V. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 507 (1980).
51. See Defunis v. Odegard, 416 U.S. 312 (1974). The Defunis case was one of the
first voluntary affirmative action programs reviewed by the United States Supreme
Court.
52. See, e.g., University of Cal. Regents v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 273-74 (1978).
(Faculty of the school instituted, on its own initiative, a dual admissions program).
53. Id at 302. Justice Powell held, in Bakke, that any program employing race must
demonstrate that the classification is necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
Id.
54. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
55. Id. at 308-09.
56. Id. at 273-74. For a discussion of preferential admissions programs, see generally, O'Neil, Preferential Admissions: Equalizing the Access of Minority Groups to
Higher Education, 80 YALE L. REV. 699 (1971).
57. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 273-74.
58. Id. at 289.
59.Id.
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The Bakke Court did not produce a majority opinion.6o
Only Justice Powell rejected the plan on Equal Protection
grounds.61 Since a classification had been made on race, Justice
Powell applied strict scrutiny to the purpose of the program and
the means employed to reach that goal.62 His analysis rejected
the notion that a lower level of scrutiny should have been applied since the program discriminated against whites, a class
which traditionally had not been subjected to discrimination. 63
Though Justice Powell believed that eliminating discrimination was a compelling governmental interest, he explained that a
finding of past discrimination must be made by a competent
governmental entity.64 The faculty of the medical school was not
viewed as a governmental body competent to make a determination of past discrimination.615
The program also failed Justice Powell's review because the
means used to promote minority participation had too severe an
impact on nonminorities. 66 He pointed out that race can be used
in a "neutral" way that falls short of barring participation of
nonminorityapplicants.67
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun wrote a separate
opinion. 68 In their view, University of California Regents v.
Bakke,69 was an affirmation of the government's authority to implement affirmative action programs.70 The Justices rejected the
60. Justice Powell rejected the school's program on equal protection grounds.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 308-09. Justices Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun and White approved
the program on equal protection grounds. [d. at 379. Chief Justice Burger, Justices Stevens, Stewart and Rehnquist rejected the program as violating Title VI or VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964. [d. at 408.
61. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 320.
62. [d.
63. [d.
64. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 307.
65. [d. at 309-10 n.59. Justice Powell was concerned that the decision was not made
by a representative body of all of the community.
66. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 316-19.
67. [d. Justice Powell approved the use of race, but only as one factor in reviewing
an applicant. [d. at 316-19.
68. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 324.
69. [d. at 265.
70. [d. at 328, 337. The Justices pointed to North Carolina v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43
(1971), which permitted voluntary programs even in the absence of a judicial determination of discriminatoion.
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notion that strict scrutiny was the proper level of review. 71 They
accepted a level closer to the intermediate leveP2 Applying this
test, the Justices approved the medical school's plan.73
More important to future decisions was the view of Justices
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun, that efforts to eradicate past
discrimination do not have to be predicated on proof that the
"recipients of preferential advancement have been individually
discriminated against; it is enough that each recipient is within a
general class of persons likely to have been victims of discrimination."74 To require a specific contemporaneous showing of discrimination would be self-defeating and would undermine efforts
to achieve voluntary compliance with Equal Protection requirements.76 The Justices concluded that the medical school's plan
could be justified by relying on national statistics which showed
an imbalance betwen the percentage of minority doctors in relationship to the percentage of minority citizens.76
In Fullilove v. Klutznick,77 a divided Court approved a Congressional plan to increase the number of contracts being
awarded to minority businesses.78 Congress was viewed as a governmental entity competent to determine if there had been prior
discrimination.79 Justice Brennan noted that Congress is not
alone in its ability to determine if there had been past discrimination.80 State legislatures, which are anologous to the Congress,
also possess the authority.81 Additionally, the state is free to
delegate this authority as it sees necessary.82

The Supreme Court still had to confront the question of
71. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 358-62.
72. [d. at 359. See supra notes 39-41 and accompanying text.
73. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 379. For a general discussion of preferential programs, see
Sandalow, Racial Preference in Higher Education, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 653 (1975).
74. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 363-64.
75. [d. at 362.
76. [d.
77. Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
78. [d. at 453-54.
79. [d. at 473-80. This position was challenged in Days, Fullilove, 96 YALE L. REv.
453 (1987). The author contends the Court, by not requiring specific evidence of past
discrimination, sent a confusing message to the lower courts on what proof is required to
establish past discrimination. [d. at 457.
80. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 366 n.42.
81. [d.
82. [d.
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what is an adequate showing of disciminatory activities. 83 The
opportunity presented itself in Wygant v. Jackson Board of
Education. 84
In Wygant,811 the Court invalidated a plan to protect minority teachers from layoffs. 86 The plan fired nonminorities who had
more seniority before firing minority teachers with less
seniority.87
The school board wanted to retain minority teachers who
faced layoffs.88 To justify the plan, the school board expressed a
desire to remedy societal discrimination by providing "role models"89 for minority students. The school board wanted to preserve a balance between the number of minority students and
minority teachers.90
Again there was no majority opinion.91 Justice Powell concluded that the school board was in error because it compared
the wrong groups in determining if there had been discrimination in the hiring practices of the school district.92 The proper
comparison should have been between the number of minorities
holding positions and the number of minorities available in the
relevant work force. 93
The requirement that an affirmative action program must
be based on past discrimination was explained by Justice Pow83. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
84. Wygant v. Board of Educ., 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
85.ld.
86. ld. at 1859-60. The plan had the approval of the teacher's union. ld. at 1844.
87. ld. The plan originated in 1972 as a result of racial tension in the community.
ld. at 1844.
88. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1859-60. In 1974, the school district violated the plan by
firing minority teachers. ld. The union brought suit and the plan to protect minority
teachers was approved by the state courts. ld. at 1844-45.
89. ld. at 1846.
90. ld. The school district showed that the percentage of minority teachers had
fallen below the percentage of minority students. ld. at 1847.
91. ld. at 1844.
92. Wygant, 106 S. Ct at 1847.
93. ld. Justice Powell pointed to the Court's decision in Hazelwood School Dist. v.
United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). In Hazelwood, a government imposed desegregation
plan was reviewed. ld. The lower court's finding of discrimination was rejected because
the government had not presented statistics comparing the number of teachers in the
Hazelwood school district and the relevant work force. ld. The Supreme Court found the
county in which the school district was located to be the relevant area. ld. at 310-13.
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ell.94 Unless the reason for implementing the program. is demonstrated, the remedies could be "timeless in their ability to effect
the future."95 Since an affirmative action plan does discriminate,
it is important that it have a limited lifespan.96 Once the problem of discrimination is remedied, the need for the race-conscious cure is over. 9'7 A program. based on general allegations of
discrimination would not provide a means for determining when
the program. is no longer needed.98
No clear consensus has emerged from the United States Supreme Court on the issue of affirmative action.99 Although the
Court has accepted that an affirmative action program. is a legal
means of combating discrimination,loo it has not produced a majority view on the issue of what constitutes an adequate demonstration of past discrimination. 101 A review of the current members of the Court will show that a favorable balance exists for
affirmative action.
C.

THE POSITION OF THE CURRENT COURT

Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blaclonun have consistently voted in favor of affirmative action. They approved the
medical school's program. in University of California Regents v.
Bakke,l°2 the Congressional plan in Fullilove v. Klutznick 103 and
the school board's efforts in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education. 104 ·Employing an intermediate level of scrutiny, the Justices
only require a showing of a "sound basis for calculating that minority underrepresentation is substantial and chronic."105 The
Justices do not require any specific findings of past dicrimina94. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1848.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 1847-48.
97. Id. at 1847.
98. Id.
99. See Justice O'Connor's opinion in Wygant, 106 S. Ct at 1853, for a discussion of
the "fragmentation" of opinions.
100. Id.
101. See generally, Kende, Principles of Competence: The Ability of Public Institutions to Adopt Remedial Affirmative Action Plans, 53 U. CHI L. REV. 581 (1986). The
author suggests that there are five distinct views. Id. at 588.
102. 438 U.S. at 379.
103. 448 U.S. 448.
104. 106 S. Ct. at 1863.
105. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 363-64.
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tion when "there is reason to believe that the evil addressed is a
product of past discrimination.mos
Justice Stevens' position has radically changed from his initial view expressed in Bakke,l°7 where he opposed affirmative action programs. I08 He joined Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun
in supporting the layoff plan of the school board in Wygant. I09
His analysis focuses on whether the purpose of a program is to
include or exclude minorities.110 When the remedial purpose is
to include minorities in a societal activity, the program meets his
initial approval. l l l The program is then evaluated as to the harm
to nonminorities.112 The standard employed by Justice Stevens
is that of fairness. 113
Justice O'Connor held in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education and Johnson v. Transportation Agency, Santa Clara
County, California,114 that in order to justify an affirmatvie action plan, there must be a firm basis for believing that remedial
action is required. 111> This basis can be established by showing a
statistical imbalance and does not require a demonstration of instances of actual discrimination.11s According to Justice
O'Connor, a showing of specific acts of discrimination would discourage voluntary affirmative action programs. ll7 Additionally, a
showing of actual discrimination would make the a governmental entity liable for violating Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.118
106. [d.
107. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408.
108. Justice Stevens adhered to a strict interpretation of § 601 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 which rejects all discrimination based on race. Bakke, 438 U.S. at 408.
109. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1867.
110. For a discussion of Justice Stevens' views, see Note, Justice Stevens' Equal
Protection Jurisprudence, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1146 (1987).
111. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1869.
112. [d. The Justice looks at two things: 1) assestment of the procedures used and 2)
review of the nature of the harm. [d.
113. [d.
114. 107 S. Ct. 1442. In Johnson, the Supreme Court approved the use of gender as
one factor in considering the promotion of a female employee of the County's transportation agency. [d. at 1446.
115. [d. at 1461.
116. [d. at 1462.
117. [d. at 1463. Justice O'Connor explained that the Court has long supported voluntary efforts to eliminate discrimination. Id.
118. [d. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it illegal for an employer to
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Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia continue to adhere to a strict interpretation of Title VII1l9 which
forbids any use of race with regards to employment120 and the
application of strict scrutiny in questions of Equal Protection.121
D.

THE VIEWS OF OTHER CIRCUITS

The Sixth Circuit in Ohio Contractors Association v.
Keip,122 upheld an affirmative action program which established
goals for the percentage of state contracting dollars going to minority businesses. 123 The legislative act which created the program,124 did not contain any statement as to its purpose nor did
it contain facts supporting findings of past discrimination.125
The Court of Appeals upheld the program's constitutionality126
because "its purpose and objective were absolutely clear from
the text and the hearings and floor debate which proceeded final
enactment."12'1 The Sixth Circuit looked beyond the legislative
act128 itself to support a finding of past discrimination. 129 The
Sixth Circuit relied primarly on the district court's finding of
disrcimination130 in the construction trade as determined in
Ethridge v. Rhodes. 131 Another source of information was a
"special task force" that investigated the presence of discriminarefuse to hire or discriminate against any person because of race. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e~
2(a) (1964).
119. Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1465.
120. See supra note 118.
121. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1857. Justice Scalia's strict statutory interpretation is
demonstrated in Johnson, 107 S. Ct. at 1465.
122. 713 F.2d 167 (6th Cir. 1983).
123. Id. at 168.
124. OHIO REV. CODE § 123.151(C)(1) (1980).
125. Keip, 713 F.2d at 170.
126. Id. at 176.
127. Id. at 170.
128. OHIO REV. CODE § 123.151(C)(1) (1980).
129. Keip, 713 F.2d at 170. The court compared the postion of the state legislators
to that of the U.S. Congress in Fullilove. Id. Both are assumed to possess knowledge of
past governmental activities which are concerned with investigations of the presence of
discrimination. Id. Congress in Fullilove was assumed to benefit from all the past activities involving the elimination of discrimination. Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 467. The Sixth
Circuit held that state legislators also benefited from past efforts to eliminate discrimination. Keip, 713 F.2d at 170.
130. Keip, 713 F.2d at 171. The court held that the state had participated with
private industry and craft unions in a pattern of racially discriminatory activity. Id.
131. 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967).
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tion in the awarding of contracts to minorities.132 The task force
report showed that while MBEs constituted 7 percent of all
businesses in Ohio, only 0.5 percent of the state's purchase contracts were given to minorities. l33 The court determined this statistical comparison was indicative of an "imbalance in the
contracts. "134
The Eleventh Circuit in South Florida Chapter of the Associated General Contractors of America, Inc. v. Metropolitian
Dade County, Florida/ 35 upheld the constitutionality of a program granting preferential treatment to minorities in the
county's contract bidding process. 13S The court held that the district court's finding of facts 137 were not only adequate,138 but
"binding unless clearly erroneous."139 The basis for justifying
the affirmative action program was the imbalance between the
minority population and both the number of minority businesses
within the county and those MBEs receiving contracts. 140 One of
the major objectives of the program was to stimulate the minority business community and promote a sense of economic equality.l4l The Eleventh Circuit noted that discrimination can retard
economic development of the minority community.142 Therefore,
preferential programs may go beyond the awarding of contracts
to minorities.143 A preferential program may help create more
MBEs.144
132. Keip, 713 F.2d at 171. The task force was established by the state attorney
general and found that there was an imbalance in the amount of business the state did
with minority groups. ld.
133. ld.
134. ld.
135. 723 F.2d 846 (11th Cir. 1984).
136. ld. at 848. The program included bid credits, set-asides and minority participation goals. ld.
137. South Fla. Chapter v. Metropolitan Dade County, 552 F. Supp. 909 (S.D. Fla.
1982).
138. South Fla. Chapter v. Metropolitan Dade County, 723 F.2d 846, 848 (11th Cir.
1984).
139. ld. at 848 n.2.
140. ld. at 848.
141. The Eleventh Circuit held that the County had a compelling interest to encourage growth in the minority business community. ld.
142. South Fla. Chapter, 723 F.2d at 857.
143. ld. at 856. The plan had as one of its purposes the development and growth of
economic and business opportunities for its community. ld.
144. ld.
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The approach employed by the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits
looked to the surrounding circumstances of each case. 145 Taken
under review by the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits were the findings of the district court/46 the legislative history of the act/47
findings of investigative agencies 148 and general population statistics which reflected a need to stimulate minority involvement
in the economy of the community.149
The Eighth Circuit in Catlett v. Missouri Highway and
Transportation Commission/ 50 affirmed that the State Highway
and Transportation Commission discriminated against women in
its hiring practices. 151 The court relied on statistical evidence
showing an imbalance between the number of women hired and
the "number expected to be hired."152 Additionally, testimonial
evidence recounting instances of discrimination was used to
show a "p;reponderance of evidence that the employer engaged
in a pattern of unlawful discrimination."l53 Relying on past Supreme Court decisions/ 54 the Eighth Circuit determined that either statistics or allegations of discrimination was sufficient to
establish a pattern of discrimination. 155 In Catlett/ 56 examples
of specific discriminatory acts and the statistical disparity established the fact that discrimination existed.157
In Higgins v. City of Vallejo/58 a Ninth Circuit case decided four months after Associated General Contractors v. City
145. See supra notes 129 and 141 and accompanying text.
146. See supra text accompanying notes 131 and 137.
147. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
148. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
149. South Fla. Chapter, 723 F.2d at 848. The Eleventh Circuit permitted the comparison of contracts awarded to minorities and general population figures. [d.
150. 828 F.2d 1260 (8th Cir. 1987).
151. [d. at 1266. It was demonstrated that while women constituted forty-eight percent of the relevant work force, less than ten percent had been hired. [d.
152. [d. at 1265.
153. [d. at 1266. Female applicants were discouraged from applying for positions
and told there would be tasks inappropriate for females. [d. at 1265-66.
154. [d. at 1265. The Eighth Circuit pointed to Hazelwood School Dist. v. U.S., 433
U.S. 299, 307-308 (1977) that required a comparison of the relevant work forces and
acceptance of antedotal evidence of discrimination. Catlett, 828 F.2d at 1265.
155. Catlett, 828 F.2d at 1265.
156. The individual claims for Title VII violations were rejected. [d. at 1264. The
class claim alleging discrimination was upheld by the Eighth Circuit. [d. at 1265.
157. [d. at 1265-66.
158. 823 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1987).
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and County of San Francisco,1I19 an affirmative action program
instituted by the City of Vallejo was reviewed and approved. 160
The court relied exclusively on the findings of the California
Fair Employment Practices Commission.161 In its report, the
Commission found that the city's hiring policy did not result in
a government work force that reflected the racial make-up of the
city.162 The report showed that while the city's population was
approximately thirty percent minority, only 11.4 percent of the
municipal work force was minority.16s Additionally, the court
pointed to the hiring practices of the fire department and reviewed the number of minorities hired betweeen the years 1972
and 1983.164 However, no relationship was made to the size of
the relevant work force in the city during that period of time. 16CS
Yet, the Ninth Circuit held that "the record provides abundant
evidence that the City of Vallejo engaged in past
discrimination. "l66
159. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d 922.
160. Higgins, 823 F.2d at 352. The suit was filed by a nonminority firefighter who
had been passed over for a promotion. [d.
161. [d. at 356. The California Fair Employment Practices Commission conducted
an investigation in 1973 and found the city's employment practices disfavored minorities. [d.
162. [d.
163. [d.
164. Higgins, 823 F.2d at 356. The first black fire department employee was not
hired until 1964. [d.
165. The court relied, instead, on the fact that in the history of the fire department,
only three blacks had ever held the position. Higgins, 823 F.2d at 356.
166. [d. In addition to the cases cited above, see Ledoux v. District of Columbia, 820
F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1987) A plan to encourage promotion of minorities and women in
the D.C. police force was challenged and remanded to the trial court for a determination
of evidence of discrimination with the proper standard to be a "greater quantum of statistical evidence, evidence of prior discrimination or some combination."; Edinger v. City
of Louisville, 802 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1986) Plan to increase minority participation in City
of Louisville contracting invalidated because the Board had offered only general population statistics to support a claim of discrimination. The court held that general population statistics were sufficient when combined with independent studies or evidence of
historical discrimination." Hammon v. Barry, 813 F.2d 412 (D.C. Cir. 1987) Rejected a
program to increase the number of minorities hired by the D.C. fire department. There
had been no showing of discrimination by plaintiffs. Relying entirely on hiring statistics,
the court found evidence of a nondiscriminatory attitude towards hiring minorities. Britton v. South Bend Community School Corp., 819 F.2d 766 (7th Cir. 1987) Invalidated a
school board plan to protect minority teachers from layoffs. The school board relied on
the same "role model" theory as was used in Wygant. The court rejected the plan because no additional evidence of discrimination was presented. Additionally, hiring statistics revealed no discrimination in the school district's hiring procedure.
In J.A. Croson Co. v. City of Richmond, 822 F.2d 1355 (4th Cir. 1987), a minority
business enterprise preference program was invalidated by the court because of a failure
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IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS
The Ninth Circuit, in Associated General Contractors v.
City and County of San Francisco,167 utilized a three part test
for reviewing the Equal Protection issue: 1) Did the city have
the authority to establish an affirmative action program which
was racially biased on its face? 2) Were the city's findings of
discrimination adequate? 3) Were the means selected adequate?168
While the court concluded that the city had the authority to
implement an affirmative action program,169 the court found
that the city failed to adequately demonstrate a finding of discrimination.170 Also, the court rejected the means employed by
the city.l7l
to show prior discrimination. Id. at 1358. The City of Richmond used general population
figures and five hours of public hearings to support its claim of discrimination in the
awarding of city contracts. Id. The dissent of Judge Sprouse explores the question of
whether statistics comparing relevant work forces always accurately portrays the presence of discrimination. Id. at 1362. Discrimination may also impact the relevant work
force of the community. Id. at 1363. General population statistics may more precisely
reflect the effect of discrimination. Id. at 1365.
In Croson, only two-thirds of one percent of contracts were awarded to minority
contractors while fifty percent of the population of Richmond was minority. Id. at 1364.
Judge Sprouse noted that these figures "[break] the bounds of the sometimes suspect
'science' of statistics and is probative of a good deal more that general discrimination."
Id. at 1365.
This view was echoed in Johnson, 107 S. Ct. 1442, by Justice O'Connor. In Johnson,
women applying for the employment position under review "had not been strongly motivated to seek training or employment." Id. at 1463. As a result, the statistical comparison of workers employed and relevant work force did not suggest discrimination. Id.
Contradicting this statistical conclusion was the fact that prior to the promotion under
review in Johnson, none of the 238 positions had ever been held by women. Id. Acknowledging the inconsistency, Justice O'Connor concluded that an affirmative action program
can be based on efforts to remedy "past apparent discrimination." Id. at 1464.
The basis for demonstrating past apparent discrimination is a determination of
whether the number of minorities in a job classification is at a reasonable level in comparison with "estimates of the number of persons from these groups in the area work
force who can meet the educational and experience requirements for employment." Id. at
1464.
I
167. 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987).
168. Id. at 928.
169. [d. at 929.
170. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 931-32.
171. Id. at 938.
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THE CITY HAVE AUTHORITY?

The question of authority was decided without an opposing
argument. 172 The Ninth Circuit relied on Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Wygant v. Jackson Board of Education l73 which held
that a state or its political subdivision has the authority to determine if it is "denying its citizens equal protection of the law
and if so, to take corrective stepS."!74 Accordingly, the Ninth
Circuit acknowledged the city's authority to establish an affirmative action program.1715
B.

WERE THE CITY'S FINDINGS ADEQUATE?

The burden was placed on the city to justify its affirmative
action program. 178 "At a minimum, the state or local government
must be acting to remedy government-imposed discrimination,
perpetuated by it."177 Emphasis was placed on the view that the
city itself must have discriminated by its own method of awarding contracts.17S The Ninth Circuit noted that societal discriminaton as the justification for a race-based program was inadequate. 179 With that perspective established, the court
reviewed the city's findings regarding past discrimination. ISO
The city relied extensively on the findings of the Human
Rights Commission.18l The Commission reported finding specific
claims of discriminatory activities conducted by the city in the
awarding of its contracts. IS2 Included in these allegations were
statements by minority firms lS3 and individuals working in the
172. Id. at 929.
173. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. 1842 (1986).
174. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 929.
175.Id.
176. Id. at 930. The Ninth Circuit held that the city could be acting only to "correct
their own past wrongdoing." Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. The Ninth Circuit was concerned that at this low level of government, measures were being decided not according to the rules of justice and the rights of a minority
party but by "a superior force of an interested and overbearing majority." Id.
179. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 930. Societal discrimination is "discrimination not traceable to its own actions." Id.
180.Id.
181. Id. at 931 n.15. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
182. See supra note 5 and text accompanying notes 5-9.
183. HRC Report, supra note 5, at 18-23.
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city that discrimination was present. 184 Statistical data was also
presented showing an imbalance in the number of city contract
dollars awarded and the number of minority firms in the city.185
The Ninth Circuit objected to the city's use of statistics in
its effort to demonstrate discrimination. 18B Specifically, the
Ninth Circuit rejected the city's attempt to relate the number of
MBEs awarded city contracts to the total number of all MBE
businesses in the city.187 According to the court, the comparison
should be limited to only those MBEs that provide the services
required by the city.18B The Ninth Circuit felt that the comparison presented by the city was not between relevant groupS.lS9
Furthermore, the city failed to include subcontractors in its
comparison. 19o Including subcontractors would have shown the
total dollar amount going to minorities.191 This was fatal because
the court could find no proof that minority subcontractors were
not receiving city dollars.192
While the Ninth Circuit praised the efforts of the city's investigators, the court nevertheless concluded that the city failed
to uncover any finding of prior discrimination since no discrimination against minorities by city officials or under color of the
city's authority had been shown. 193

C.

WERE THE MEANS SELECTED APPROPRIATE?

Relying on Regents of University of California u. Bakke,194
the Ninth Circuit employed the requirement that the "means
adopted must be narrowly tailored. "195 Again the city failed to
pass the court's scrutiny because the program encompassed all
184. [d.
185. HRC Report, supra note 5, at 27-31.
186. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 931.
187. [d. at 933.
188. [d. at 933·34.
189. [d.
190. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 933.
191. [d. The HRC Report showed that in 1982, 19.3 percent of the city's contracting
dollars went to construction subcontractors. [d. at 933 n.22.
192. [d. at 933.
193. [d. at 931-32.
194. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
195. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 934.
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aspects of city contracting. 196 The court was concerned with the
fact that the ordinance "casts such a wide net"197 since it was
not limited to one area of contracting.19S The fault of a program
encompassing all aspects of the city's contracting needs was that
the distribution of available MBEs was uneven. 199 Some business areas have very few MBEs to draw from.200 Similarlly, the
Panel noted that the distribution of non-MBEs was not uniform.201 As a result, "a non-MBE business in an industry heavily
dependent upon city procurement where MBEs have a significant share of the market, may well be destroyed."202 With this
potential for destruction of non-MBE enterprises, the Ninth
Circuit faulted the city's plan because it offered no means to
ameliorate such a harsh effect.203
The court also determined that an administrative procedure
designed to safeguard non-MBEs against the harsh effects of inequitable application was missing. 204 A proper administrative
remedy would have provided a mechanism through which nonMBEs could raise the objection that the city's efforts: 1) did not
apply to their industry; 2) would have too harsh an impact on
the non-MBE; or 3) was being used by MBEs to reap a windfall. 20G The Ninth Circuit determined that such a safeguard was
"entirely lacking" in this ordinance.206
Finally, the court determined that other untested means are
available for remedying the limited participation of MBEs in the
contracting process.207 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the city
196. [d. at 936.
197. [d.
198. [d. at 936. The city contracts included "everything from construction and consulting to interpreting and book binding." [d.
199. [d.
200. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 936.
201. [d.
202. [d.
203. [d. at 937-38. The plan in fact does contain provisions for waiving the requirement when it can be shown that compliance is not feasible or "sufficient qualified Minority and Women Business Enterprises capable of providing the goods or services required
are unavailable in the market area of the project." SAN FRANCISCO, CA., ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE ch. 12D § 12D:9(2)(a) (1980).
204. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 937-38.
205. [d. at 938.
206. [d.
207. [d. at 938-39. Some of the court's suggestions included eliminating arbitrary
imposition of bonding and insurance requirements, increasing the amount of advertising
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had not explored less drastic means. 208 Thus, until such means
are explored by the city and shown to have failed, the use of bid
preferences cannot be justified.209
In summary, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the ordinance violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution210 because the city had not demonstrated an adequate finding of discrimination in the method it was using to award
contracts211 and had not explored less restrictive means of remedying the alleged problems associated with minority contract
awards. 212

v.

CRITIQUE

The City of San Francisco's affirmative action program was
found to be unconstitutional by the Ninth Circuit on the basis
that the city failed to show "any discrimination against minorities by city officials or under color of the city's authority."213 The
court relied extensively on the language of Justice O'Connor in
Wygant.214 Yet the Wygant Court made clear the Supreme
Court's position that specific acts of discrimination are not only
unnecessary but unrealistic given the liability exposure that
such an admission would create.215 The Ninth Circuit's position
requiring "the governmental entity itself discriminated"216 contradicts the Wygant view. 217 "The imposition of a requirement
that public employers make findings that they have engaged in
illegal discrimination before they engage in affirmative action
programs would severely undermine public employers' incentive
to voluntarily meet their civil rights obligations."218 Yet the
of available contracts and providing educational programs for minority businesses. Id.
208. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F. 2d at 938.
209. Id. at 939. The position taken by the city was that earlier efforts to promote
minority particpation had failed. Petition for Rehearing for, Appellant at 6, Associated
Gen. Contractors v. City of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987).
210. Id. at 944.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of San Francisco, 813 F.2d 922, 931-32 (9th
Cir. 1987).
214. Id. at 930.
215. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1855.
216. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 930.
217. Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1855.
218. [d.
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Ninth Circuit objects to the city's program because the city
failed to demonstrate specific acts of discrimination.219
Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's finding, the district court
found sufficient evidence of discrimination on the part of the
city.220 The district court, even without the guidance of the Wygant decision, compared the percentage of contracts awarded to
minorities with the number of minority firms available in the
relevant work force. 221 The statistics showed that while 30.59
percent of all construction firms in San Francisco are minority
owned, they were awarded no more than 2.8 percent of all city
contracts.222 In spite of this conclusion, no where does the Ninth
Circuit refer to the district court's findings of fact.223
Also overlooked by the Ninth Circuit was the report submitted by the Human Rights Commission (HRC)224 showing that
twelve of the forty-two individuals or firms which testified
before the Commission expressed specific allegations of racial
discrimination. 225 Additionally, testimony of city personnel revealed individual department practices made it virtually impossible for new firms to break into the contracting process.226
The city had made attempts to encourage minority participation in city contracting through programs prior to the program in the instant case.227 Efforts to aid MBEs by requiring
nonminority contractors to use MBEs as subcontractors had
failed. 228 The HRC documented that in eleven cases, MBE sub219. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 931-32.
220. Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of San Francisco, 619 F. Supp. 334, 340
(N.D. Cal. 1985).
221. [d. at 340 n.3.
222. [d.
223. The failure of the Ninth Circuit to discuss the district court's finding of facts
raises the issue of when an Appeals Court can overrule a district court's finding of facts.
The position of the Supreme Court was discussed in Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456
U.S. 273 (1982). The Pullman Court held that a district court's finding of facts can not
be overruled unless they are shown to be "clearly erroneous." [d. at 287.
224. HRC Report, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
225. HRC Report, supra note 5, at 9-14.
226. HRC Report, supra note 5, at 31.
227. Earlier attempts by the city included legislation aimed at fighting employment
discrimination by firms contracting with the city. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 12B (1978).
Additionally, the city attempted to encourage the use of minority subcontractors by
those contracting with the city. ADMINISTRATIVE CODE ch. 12B(9) and 12 (B)4(c)(5) 1980.
228. See Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of San Francisco, 619 F. Supp. 334
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contactors were dropped by the prime contractors once the contracts were awarded. 229
The HRC Report discussed the significance and necessity of
supporting efforts to encourage the use of MBEs as primary contractors. The business advantages are: 1) a provision for overhead expenses is incorporated into the prime bid but not the
subcontractor's bid; 2) profit is greater for the prime; and 3) the
prime contractor selects, utilizes, and ultimately pays the
subcontractors.230
Since the efforts to aid MBE had failed,231 the city devised a
program that direclty encouraged minority participation in city
contracting. 232 Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's finding, the city
had explored less drastic means which were found to be
ineffective.233
The Ninth Circuit held that evidence of MBE participation
in city contracting as subcontractors was sufficient to refute
charges of racial discrimination. 234 This reasoning is disturbing
because it would allow for discrimination on the level of primary
contractors as long as it can be shown that some city dollars are
trickling down to minority subcontractors.235
Finally, the 'view that the city must demonstrate specific
acts of discrimination to support the imposition of an affirmative
action program is not consistent with the views expressed by
other Circuit Courts of Appeals. 236
(N.D. Cal. 1985). Finding of facts and conclusions of law, Finding 9.
229. HRC Report, supra note 5, at 9-14.
230. HRC Report, supra note 5, at 30.
231. See Associated Gen. Contractors, 619 F. Supp. 334, findings of facts and conclusions of law, Finding 9.
232.Id.
233. Id. Additionally, there is no requirement that the least restrictive means be
employed. Fullilooe, 448 U.S. at 508.
234. Associated Gen. Contractors, 813 F.2d at 933.
235. The advantages for promoting minority participation in the city contracting
process as prime contractors was discussed by the Human Rights Commission. HRC Report, supra note 5, at 30.
236. The other Circuit Courts have accepted statistical evidence and anecdotal
claims of discrimination to support the need for affirmative action programs. See supra
text accompanying notes 122-66.
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VI. CONCLUSION
For the past ten years, the Supreme Court has both recognized the need for affirmative action programs and struggled
with the method for analyzing whether such a program was constitutional. As one commentator has pointed out, "[flew issues
are more starkly divisive in our politics than affirmative action
... [n]o one standard of review or formula applying it [has]
ever captured five votes ... [b]ut all nine Justices [have] said
that classifications favoring racial minorities may sometimes be
tolerated . . . ."237
The Ninth Circuit in Associated General Contractors v.
City and County of 'San Francisco,238 employed the three part
test used by the Supreme Court in reviewing affirmative action
programs.239 The court erred in its application of the test to the
specific facts of this case.240 The Ninth Circuit's criterion for
demonstrating past discrimination is out-of-step with its own
view, as expressed in other Ninth Circuit cases,241 as well as developments in other circuits242 and the Supreme COurt.243 This
decision of the Ninth Circuit stands alone in requiring a demonstration of specific acts of discrimination by the governmental
agency.244
The Ninth Circuit ignored the findings of discrimination by
237. Sullivan, Sins of Discrimination: Last Term's Affirmative Action Cases, 100
HARv. L. REV. 1, 118 (1986).
238. 813 F.2d 922 (9th Cir. 1987).
239. [d. at 929. The three-part test consisted of the following: 1) Did the city have
the authority to establish the program? 2) Were the city's findings of discrimination
adequate? 3) Were the means selected adequate? [d.
240. The Ninth Circuit failed to acknowledge that, statistically, the city demonstrated that in the construction industry, at least, there was an imbalance in the number
of contracts awarded to minority firms. Associated Gen. Contractors, 619 F. Supp. 334,
340 n.3.
241. See, e.g., Higgins v. City of Vallejo, 823 F.2d 351 (9th Cir. 1987). See text accompanying notes 158-66.
242. See text accompanying notes 122-66 and note 166.
243. See, e.g., Wygant, 106 S. Ct. at 1853. The Wygant decision confirmed that evidence of specific acts of discrimination are inconsistent with its desire to encourage voluntary eradication of discrimination. [d.
244. The liability exposure that would result from such admissions has been highlighted as the primary reason for not requiring such specific admissions. See Johnson,
107 S. Ct. at 1463.
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the Human Rights Commission and the district court245 which
supports the conclusion that even statistical data required by
Wygant will not satisfy this court's requirement for a demonstration of past discrimination. The Ninth Circuit decision raises
the barrier for affirmative action programs to insurmountable
heights. Whether any affirmative action program could pass the
scrutiny of the Ninth Circuit is in question after this decision.

Christopher Windle*

245. HRC Report, supra note 5, at 9-14, 31. The HRC Report provided anecdotal
and statistical evidence of discrimination. Id. The district court found statistical evidence of discriminatory practices in the methods used by the city in awarding its contracts. Associated Gen. Contractors, 619 F. Supp. 334, 340 n.3.
* Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1988.
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